政府投资项目中的不完全信息静态博弈模型分析
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F810.452

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Analysis of static game model with incomplete information for government project tendering
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    摘要:

    针对投标企业采取不平衡报价的投标策略,从政府的角度出发,运用不完全信息静态博弈模型理论来探索政府的最优策略.研究结果表明,政府投资项目避免不平衡报价招标的最优策略应为最大限度地吸引合格投标人参与竞标,并建立一种使不平衡报价受损、平衡报价受益的正外部效应机制.

    Abstract:

    Aiming at achieving the maximum profit,the companies will always take unequal bidding as their bidding strategy during tendering.An optimal strategy for government is put forward by use of static game tendering model with incomplete information from the stand of the government,(what's) more,some policy suggestions are proposed to achieve the winwin for the government and the company.The results of the findings indicate that the optimal strategy of government project tendering is that government should attract qualified companies as many as possible to participate in the tendering of government project,improve the legislation and environment,and establish a mechanism that makes unequal bidding unprofitable,and equal bidding profitable.

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饶海琴,徐彩红.政府投资项目中的不完全信息静态博弈模型分析[J].上海理工大学学报,2006,(4):386-390.

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  • 收稿日期:2005-10-20
  • 最后修改日期:2006-04-17
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