异地高考的博弈论分析
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上海市一流学科建设资助项目(XTKX2012)


Analysis of College Entrance Examination in Other Place Based on Game Theory
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    摘要:

    针对北京、上海两地区当地群体与随迁子女群体之间就异地高考问题的激烈争论,建立了异地高考两大对立群体之间的静态博弈模型,解释了随迁子女群体希望在当地参加高考,而北京、上海本地群体坚决反对的原因.又通过建立教育部与北上广等地当地政府之间的动态博弈模型,指出教育部与当地政府之间的博弈是可以达到帕累托最优的,从而为学者们从定量的角度提出解决异地高考措施提供理论基础.另外,从教育部、当地政府、考生和家长这3个角度提出了解决异地高考问题、实现教育公平的政策建议.

    Abstract:

    Aiming at heated controversy between local residents and immigrant children in Beijing and Shanghai about college entrance examination in other place,a static game model was built between two opposing groups of college entrance examination in other place.The reasons why immigrant children want to take college entrance examination in that place and why local residents of Beijing and Shanghai are against it strongly were explained.From the other side,a dynamic game model between the Ministry of Education and local governments of Beijing,Shanghai and Guangzhou was built to indicate that the game between them can achieve Pareto optimality state.Therefore,from a point of quantitative view,the scholars can put forward solutions of college entrance examination in other place based on the above theories.Moreover,some solutions were put forward to realize the fairness education from the perspective of the Ministry of Education,local government and students and parents.

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王玉龙,王波.异地高考的博弈论分析[J].上海理工大学学报,2015,37(2):194-198.

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  • 收稿日期:2013-10-13
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  • 在线发布日期: 2015-05-19
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