回收责任分担下闭环供应链奖惩机制研究
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F274

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(71840003);上海市软科学研究重点项目(19692104000)


Reward and punishment mechanism of closed-loop supply chain under recycling responsibility-sharing
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    摘要:

    为研究政府奖惩机制对闭环供应链决策的影响,建立集中式决策模型,以及仅由再制造商承担回收责任、再制造商分别和制造商及零售商分担回收责任的奖惩机制分散式决策模型,通过博弈论分析法求得各均衡解,并进行数值算例验证。研究表明:分散式决策模型下新产品批发价和零售价相等;仅由再制造商承担回收责任情况下的回收率大于制造商和零售商分担回收责任情况下的回收率,且回收率随政府奖惩力度的提高而增大;制造商、零售商与再制造商分担回收责任时,利润增加,制造商及零售商承担回收责任比例越大,利润越高。

    Abstract:

    In order to study the influence of government reward and punishment mechanism on the decision-making of closed-loop supply chain, a centralized decision-making model and a decentralized decision-making model of reward and punishment mechanism were established. In the centralized model, remanufacturers were responsible for recycling, while in the decentralized model, remanufacturers share the responsibility of recycling with manufacturers and retailers respectively. The results show that the wholesale price and retail price of new products are equal in decentralized decision-making model. The recovery rate of remanufacturer under the responsibility of recycling is greater than that of manufacturer and retailer. The recovery rate increases with the increase of government rewards and punishments. When the manufacturer, retailer and remanufacturer share the recycling responsibility, the profit increases. The greater the proportion of responsibility for the manufacturer and retailer, the higher the profit.

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许海娟,李芳,闫斌灵.回收责任分担下闭环供应链奖惩机制研究[J].上海理工大学学报,2021,43(2):186-193.

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  • 收稿日期:2020-07-18
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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-05-08
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