China's renewable portfolio standards (RPS) has experienced a shift from the generation side to the sales and distribution side. Is this shift conducive to build novel power system and how to further optimize this model? To address these issues, a RPS model for different responsible entities was developed. The changes of market prices and revenues under various scenarios were analyzed. An enhanced RPS system that accounts for generator differences and considers incentives and penalties was designed. The evaluation index was constructed to reflect the number of tradable green certificate (TGC) acquired by different generators. The completion of the RPS target was measured to penalize or reward the electricity sellers. A game model was developed and simulated by using the inverse induction method. The results show that the RPS system on the sales and distribution side is better than the system on the generation side. Although there are barriers to the incentive and penalty policies of the enhanced quota system, reasonable settings can promote renewable energy consumption and achieve benign development.