基于四方博弈的销售员亲组织非伦理行为形成机制
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C 939

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(72272094, 71871144)


Formation mechanism of salespersons' unethical pro-organizational behavior based on four-party game
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    摘要:

    学界关注亲组织非伦理行为(UPB)的企业盈利和伦理破坏属性,却忽略了UPB利润源头是消费者,伦理维护者是政府,行动者销售员亦存在私利风险。整合销售员、企业、消费者和政府四方的成本收益诉求,探索UPB的形成机制。借助博弈论推算主体稳定性策略及其均衡点位置,并在均衡范围内进行了系统动力学仿真分析。结果发现,销售员UPB会分别受到企业、政府和消费者决策的限制,特别是在缺乏UPB动机时,仅企业管控就可彻底遏制UPB的发生。其中,消费者举报与否对销售员UPB形成的影响强度最大,政府消极监督的影响时效最长。企业加强对销售员UPB的处罚,或在企业不作为时政府代为处罚均能达到理想效果。该结论厘清了UPB的利益相关者成本收益形成框架,为其系统性联合规制方案提供了参考。

    Abstract:

    The academic community has focused on the corporate profitability and ethical destructiveness of unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB), yet it has overlooked that consumers are the source of profits derived from UPB, the government serves as the guardian of ethics, and salesperson—the actors of such behavior—also face risks of self-interest. This paper integrated the cost-benefit demands of the four parties: salesperson, enterprises, consumers and government, and explored the formation mechanism of UPB. By using game theory, this study deduced the stable strategies of the subjects and the position of the equilibrium point, and conducted a system dynamics simulation analysis within the equilibrium range. The results show that salesperson UPB is restricted by the decisions of enterprises, governments and consumers respectively, especially when there is no motivation for UPB, only enterprise control can completely prevent the occurrence of UPB. Among them, whether consumers report or not has the greatest impact on the formation of salesperson UPB, and the negative supervision of the government has the longest impact duration. Strengthening the punishment of salesperson UPB by enterprises or having the government impose penalties when enterprises do not act can achieve the desired effect. This conclusion clarifies the cost-benefit formation framework of UPB from the perspectives of stakeholders and provides a reference for its systematic joint regulation schemes.

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刘生敏,马艳华,何建佳.基于四方博弈的销售员亲组织非伦理行为形成机制[J].上海理工大学学报,2026,48(2):225-238.

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  • 收稿日期:2025-01-15
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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-05-11
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